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TO FAX OR NOT TO FAX: ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATIONS
AND POTENTIAL BURDENS IMPOSED BY THE JUNK FAX
PREVENTION ACT OF 2005
1

Michael R. Laudino ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

In modern times, low-cost technology has made it relatively easy
2
for telemarketing companies to solicit consumers. The increasingly
widespread use of telemarketing in recent years has led to the enact3
ment of numerous laws aimed at curbing telemarketers’ practices.
Recently, Congress has expressed concern over the current state of
the law with respect to unsolicited commercial advertisements that
4
are sent to fax machines, otherwise known as “junk faxes.” Since
1991, this area of law has evolved dramatically as Congress has sought
to achieve a proper balance between the property interests and privacy concerns of junk fax recipients and the advertising interests of
5
junk fax senders. The difficulty lies in maximizing the efficiency of
potential regulations in this area, while decreasing the burden imposed on the interests of the parties involved.

1

Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
J.D. Candidate, 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S.B.A. in Finance,
2003, University of Delaware.
2
Jennifer L. Radner, Comment, Phone, Fax, and Frustration: Electronic Commercial
Speech and Nuisance Law, 42 EMORY L.J. 359, 376 (1993) (“In recent years, possibly due
to the growing intrusiveness of new communications technology, it seems that regulating communications media has grown in popularity.”).
3
See Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005; Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (Supp. IV 2004)); Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
4
The receipt of a junk fax is very similar to the receipt of spam e-mail, only
transmitted through a fax machine.
5
See Telephone Consumer Protection Act § 2(9) (reporting congressional findings); see also 137 CONG. REC. H11307, 11310–11315 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (discussing improvements in the law that would help to achieve the appropriate balance
in this area).
∗
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Congress has attempted to achieve the appropriate balance with
6
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991 and
through subsequent modifications set forth in the Junk Fax Preven7
tion Act (JFPA) of 2005. However, the strict language of the TCPA
required a sender to obtain “prior express invitation or permission”
8
before any unsolicited advertising, inappropriately tipping the balance in favor of the junk fax recipient while inadequately addressing
9
the sender’s marketing concerns. Although the JFPA was intended
to improve upon the TCPA’s regulations by alleviating a portion of
10
the junk fax sender’s burden, the JFPA’s new “established business
11
12
relationship” (EBR) and “opt-out clause” provisions fail to adequately protect the interests of those who are forced to bear the burden of unwanted faxes.
This Comment will focus on the regulatory efforts that have
been imposed concerning junk faxes, the evolution of the various
regulations in this area, and the possibility of establishing more efficient and balanced controls. Part II of this Comment will discuss the
history of the TCPA, how the TCPA and its regulations came to fruition, and the importance of the various provisions dealing with junk
faxes. Next, Part III will analyze the courts’ interpretation of the
TCPA, mainly with respect to unsolicited faxes and telemarketing.
Part III will briefly discuss how courts have interpreted the TCPA and
its ban on unsolicited junk faxes in light of criticisms that it violates a
13
person’s First Amendment right to commercial speech. Part IV will
address the recent changes set forth in the JFPA and the balance that
the JFPA attempts to achieve with respect to junk faxes. In addition,
Part IV.A will examine the ability of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) under the JFPA to interpret and affect the dynamic landscape of junk fax law. Furthermore, Part IV.B will discuss
the practical effects of the JFPA, along with the protections and exceptions provided by the JFPA. Finally, Part V will propose, and argue for, more balanced junk fax law regulations in order to tailor and
6
Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
7
Pub. L. No. 109-21,119 Stat. 359 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227).
8
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000 & Supp. 2003). The JFPA eliminated this provision. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
9
151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5265 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
10
Id.
11
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
12
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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improve upon the current provisions in the JFPA. The proposals include a variety of different approaches designed to achieve Congress’
14
ultimate objective. The most notable approaches are (1) an opt-in
approach for potential junk fax receivers and (2) more flexibility for
15
the FCC to specify when an “established business relationship” is
created. These recommendations are intended to balance both the
privacy and property concerns of junk fax recipients, while easing the
burden imposed on junk fax senders and facilitating their marketing
interests.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF UNSOLICITED
COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING AND THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER
16
PROTECTION ACT OF 1991
The recent technological advances available to marketers have
helped to create a much more powerful and efficient telemarketing
industry. Unfortunately, these advances have placed a substantial
17
burden on potential consumers and their privacy interests. These
consumers have expressed concern over the lack of regulations imposed on the telemarketing industry, and many Americans have insisted that action be taken in order to relieve them from unwanted,
18
irritable, and costly solicitations. Most importantly, more stringent
regulations were needed to control “automatic dialers, junk faxes,
19
and unwanted telephone solicitations.”
In 1991, Congress responded to consumers’ widespread criticisms by adding the TCPA to Title II of the Communications Act of
20
1934. The primary purpose of the TCPA was “to prohibit certain

14

See infra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii).
16
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
17
137 CONG. REC. H11307, 11310 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Markey) (“[T]he aim of [the TCPA] is not to eliminate the brave new world of telemarketing, but rather to secure an individual’s right to privacy that might be unintentionally intruded upon by these new technologies.”); see also Radner, supra note 2,
at 377 (noting that although the use of technology to facilitate unsolicited commercial advertising has become quite a profitable industry, telephone and facsimile solicitation is a burden on the recipients of this advertising and has grown exponentially with recent technological advances).
18
Adam Zitter, Note, Good Laws for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited
Solicitations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2822 (2004).
19
137 CONG. REC. H11307, 11311 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep.
Rinaldo).
20
Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394. The TCPA amended Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2000).
15
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practices involving the use of telephone equipment” by placing “restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the home and
22
by restricting certain uses of fax machines and automatic dialers.”
Congress felt that “[i]ndividuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests,
and commercial freedoms of speech and trade [should] be balanced
in a way that protects the privacy of individuals and permits legitimate
23
telemarketing practices.” The TCPA was “the first significant step in
curbing what many perceived as an onslaught of telemarketing that
24
The regulations adopted by the
had invaded American homes.”
TCPA attempted to control the burden imposed by a completely unrestricted telemarketing industry, while balancing the technological
advances in telemarketing with the right to privacy that individuals
25
are entitled to maintain in their homes.
The TCPA makes it unlawful for a person “to make any call . . .
using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice” to a service where the receiving party would be charged
26
for the call. Also, the TCPA prohibits anyone from initiating a call
to a “residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded

21

See 47 U.S.C. § 227.
Edwin L. Klett & Rochelle L. Brightwell, Telemarketing: Exercise in Free Speech or
Just a Pain in the Neck?, 24 PA. LAWYER 38, 39 (2002). The telemarketing industry has
evolved into a booming business due to “the increased use of cost-effective telemarketing techniques.” Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102243, §§ 2(1), (4), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (reporting congressional findings).
23
§ 2(9), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394(reporting congressional findings).
24
Hillary B. Miller and Robert R. Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act to Intrastate Telemarketing Calls and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 668
(2000).
25
Howard E. Berkenblit, Note, Can Those Telemarketing Machines Keep Calling
Me?—The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 After Moser v. FCC, 36 B.C. L. REV.
85, 96 (1994). More specifically, Congress found that “[o]ver 30,000 businesses actively telemarket goods and services to business and residential customers.” § 2(2),
105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (reporting congressional findings); see also id. § 2(5), 105 Stat.
2394, 2394 (“Unrestricted telemarketing, however, can be an intrusive invasion of
privacy and, when an emergency telephone line is seized, a risk to public safety.”); id.
§ 2(8), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (“The constitution does not prohibit restrictions on commercial telemarketing solicitations.”); id. § 2(11), 105 Stat. 2394, 2394 (“Technologies that might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls are not universally
available, are costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on
the consumer.”).
26
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). Although every call for
which the receiving party would be charged is banned, certain calls are specifically
mentioned by this section, such as those to a cell phone or paging service. Id. However, there is an exception if the call was made for emergency purposes or if it was
made with the “prior express consent” of the party receiving the call. Id. §
227(b)(1)(A).
22
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voice . . . without the prior express consent of the called party.”
Although the TCPA did not specifically address “live” unsolicited telephone calls, the TCPA enabled the FCC to establish a national donot-call database for those who do not wish to receive such telephone
28
solicitations.
In addition, one of the primary goals of the TCPA was to prohibit unsolicited commercial advertisements sent to fax machines,
29
known as “junk faxes.” As the use of fax machines continued to
grow, junk mail’s electronic equivalent, the “junk fax,” had also be30
come prevalent.
Although junk fax advertising is similar to tele31
marketing calls in that it invades an individual’s privacy interest, it
imposes additional burdens on the recipients as well. One of the
burdens that concerned Congress was the shifting of the sender’s
costs to the recipient, who is inappropriately forced to bear the ex32
penses associated with the receipt of the fax.
Representative Edward Markey of Massachusetts, quoting an article from the Washington
Post, stated that “receiving junk fax is like getting junk mail with the
33
34
postage due.” In a 2003 case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit suggested that a junk fax recipient bore more
than $100 a year in direct costs “which came in the form of paper,
toner, time required to recognize and discard unwanted faxes, and
35
the temporary inability to send and receive faxes.”
Moreover, junk faxes can inconvenience recipients for various
reasons. The marketer’s ability to send out numerous unsolicited fax
advertisements could extend to all hours of the day, and a recipient’s
27

Id. § 227(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). There is also an exception here if the
call was made for emergency purposes or if the call “is exempted by rule or order by
the Commission under paragraph (2)(B).” Id.
28
Id. § 227(c)(3). Though the power to create this national do-not-call registry
was granted to the FCC, the registry was not put into effect until October 1, 2003. .In
re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R.
14,014, 14,034 (2003).
29
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).
30
136 CONG. REC. H5818, 5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
31
137 CONG. REC. S16204, 16208 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Bentsen).
32
136 CONG. REC. H5818, 5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
33
Id. (quoting Jerry Knight, The Junk Fax Attack: Why Maryland May Outlaw Unsolicited Advertisements, WASH. POST, May 23, 1989, at C3).
34
Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
35
Zitter, supra note 18, at 2807 (citing Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d at 655); see also
Destination Ventures v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56–57 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing the significant costs borne by a junk fax recipient).
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phone line(s) could be tied up for a substantial period of time, effec36
tively preventing the recipient from receiving any other faxes. In
addition, the recipient is forced to sort through and decipher be37
tween important faxes and those which can be discarded. Unfortunately for these recipients, junk fax advertising is an extremely attrac38
tive marketing option for advertisers because of its cost-efficiencies.
For instance, the sender of the fax generally incurs only the cost of
39
making a simple telephone call.
To alleviate these problems, the TCPA set out to create a complete ban on unsolicited commercial faxes, making it “unlawful for
any person within the United States . . . to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited adver40
tisement to a telephone facsimile machine.”
Furthermore, Con41
gress defined the term “unsolicited advertisement” in the TCPA as
“any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any
property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person with42
These
out that person’s prior express invitation or permission.”
provisions in the original TCPA were very protective of the junk fax
recipient because they required his or her “express invitation or permission” before enabling a sender to transmit an unsolicited adver43
tisement via fax. Congress was careful to select this requirement of
“express invitation or permission” in the TCPA over a potential alternative method that would require recipients to “opt-out” of any unsolicited faxes that they did not wish to receive:

36
136 CONG. REC. H5818, 5820 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Ritter).
37
David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (1997).
38
Michael A. Fisher, Note, The Right to Spam? Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 363, 380 (2000) (“The involuntary shifting of costs onto fax
recipients prompted Congress to include 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) as part of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991.”).
39
Sorkin, supra note 37, at 1008.
40
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). Congress subsequently
amended this section of the TCPA with the new provisions included in the JFPA. 47
U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
41
47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4).
42
Id. This was the section in the original TCPA, Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat.
2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000 & Supp. 2003)). Since
the enactment of the JFPA, the definition has been modified. Under the new definition, the term “unsolicited advertisement” means “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted
to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission, in writing
or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5) (2000 & Supp. III 2003) (emphasis added).
43
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).
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The legislative history indicates that one of Congress’ primary
concerns was to protect the public from bearing the costs of unwanted advertising. Certain practices were treated differently because they impose costs on consumers. For example, under the
TCPA, calls to wireless phones and numbers for which the called
party is charged are prohibited in the absence of an emergency or
without the prior express consent of the called party. Because of
the cost shifting involved with fax advertising, Congress similarly
prohibited unsolicited faxes without the prior express permission
of the recipient. Unlike the do-not-call list for telemarketing calls,
Congress provided no mechanism for opting out of unwanted facsimile advertisements. Such an opt-out list would require the recipient to possibly bear the cost of the initial facsimile and inappropriately place the burden on the recipient to contact the
44
sender and request inclusion on a “do-not-fax” list.
45

Therefore, when the TCPA went into effect on December 20, 1992,
the statute more than adequately addressed the concerns expressed
by junk fax recipients, allowing them to sue the sender of an unsolicited junk fax if the fax was sent without their “prior express invitation
46
or permission.”
III.

CHALLENGES TO THE TCPA AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Telemarketers have frequently argued that the TCPA unlawfully
47
restricts their right to commercial speech, which has traditionally
been protected under the First Amendment to the United States
48
Constitution. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
49
Commission of New York, the Supreme Court of the United States articulated a four-pronged test in order to determine whether commer50
The Court held that a
cial speech has been properly restricted.
regulation on commercial speech is permissible if: (1) the First

44
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18
F.C.C.R. 14,014, 14,128 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
45
Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (1991) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
227).
46
47 U.S.C. §§ 227(a)(4), (b)(3). Although this may have been the intended effect of the original TCPA, the FCC interpreted these provisions differently. See infra
note 89 and accompanying text.
47
See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 652 (8th Cir.
2003); Destination Ventures v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 55 (9th Cir. 1995); Kenro, Inc. v. Fax
Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162, 1167 (S.D. Ind. 1997).
48
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
49
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
50
Id. at 566.
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51

Amendment protects the speech; (2) a substantial governmental interest is asserted; (3) the regulation directly advances this asserted interest; and (4) the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that inter52
est.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has determined that commercial speech is entitled to substantial constitutional protection, although it should be afforded less protection than other forms of ex53
pression. The Court also found that there must be a “reasonable
fit” between the interest sought and the governmental regulations,
but the regulations do not have to be the “least restrictive” means to
54
achieve their desired interest. Considering the Supreme Court’s interpretations, the TCPA has consistently withstood scrutiny in the
federal courts under the Central Hudson test for First Amendment re55
strictions on commercial speech.
56
In Destination Ventures v. FCC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the TCPA’s ban on unsolicited advertisements was justified because Congress’ intended goal
57
was to prevent cost-shifting in advertising. The circuit court held
that the TCPA’s ban on unsolicited fax advertising was narrowly tai58
lored to meet the government’s interest.
Similarly, the United
59
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
TCPA’s restrictions were proportionate and narrowly tailored to the
government’s interests because there were other forms of advertising
60
still available to advertisers. The court noted that unsolicited fax
advertising caused significant interference and cost-shifting onto the
61
recipients. Despite these frequent challenges to the TCPA’s consti-

51

To satisfy this provision, according to the Court, commercial speech must not
be misleading and must concern lawful activity. Id.
52
Id.
53
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64–68 (1983); see also Bd. of
Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (“‘[C]ommercial speech [enjoys] a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of
First Amendment values,’ and is subject to ‘modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression.’” (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (alteration in original))).
54
Fox, 492 U.S. at 477–80.
55
See infra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
56
46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995).
57
Id. at 56.
58
Id.
59
Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
60
Id. at 659.
61
Id.
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62

tutionality, the provisions of the TCPA regarding junk faxes had
63
Conseremained good law at the time of the JFPA’s revisions.
quently, the prevalence of marketing through the use of junk faxes
64
had experienced a dramatic decline.
IV.

THE JUNK FAX PREVENTION ACT OF 2005—THE MOST RECENT
ADDITION TO THE TCPA

On July 9, 2005, President Bush signed the Junk Fax Prevention
65
66
Act into law. The JFPA amended the TCPA by adding a few major
67
provisions. While the effects of these new provisions remain to be
seen, they have the potential to dramatically alter the existing landscape of junk faxing. First, the JFPA eliminates the “prior express
68
permission” provision set forth in the original TCPA. The JFPA now
enables junk faxes to be sent so long as there is an “established busi69
ness relationship” (“EBR”) between the sender and the receiver of
70
the fax. An EBR is currently defined by the JFPA as:
[A] prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way
communication between a person or entity and a residential subscriber with or without an exchange of consideration, on the basis
of the subscriber’s purchase or transaction with the entity within
the eighteen (18) months immediately preceding the date of the
telephone call or on the basis of the subscriber’s inquiry or appli-

62

See, e.g., Kenro, Inc. v. Fax Daily, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that the ban on junk faxes directly relates to the government’s interest in protecting consumers from intrusion on their fax machines and from advertiser’s cost shifting and that the ban is narrowly tailored). The Kenro court added that faxes were
different from junk mail, newspaper ads, and television because of the costs and potential interference with legitimate business activity that faxes impose on unwilling
consumers. Id. at 1168.
63
Zitter, supra note 18, at 2774.
64
Id.
65
Pub. L. No. 109-21, 119 Stat. 359 (2005) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000 &
Supp. 2006)).
66
Press Release, The White House, President Signs Junk Fax Prevention Act of
2005 (July 11, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2005/07/20050711.html.
67
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(a)(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006) (defining an EBR
for purposes of the JFPA); id. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (establishing exceptions to
the general ban on junk faxes without “prior express permission”); id. §§
227(b)(2)(D)–(G) (further enhancing the FCC’s power to implement the requirements of the JFPA).
68
Id. § 227(b)(1)(C). The JFPA added subsections (b)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) which provided new exceptions, such as the EBR, to the “prior express permission” requirement that did not previously exist under the TCPA.
69
Id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(i).
70
Id.
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cation regarding products or services offered by the entity within
the three months immediately preceding the date of the call,
which relationship has not been previously terminated by either
71
party.

However, the JFPA subjects the duration of an EBR’s existence to any
72
time limitations that the FCC determines appropriate.
Furthermore, the JFPA enables a junk faxer to send these unsolicited faxes if the sender obtained the recipient’s fax number
through “a directory, advertisement, or site on the Internet to which
the recipient voluntarily agreed to make available its facsimile num73
ber for public distribution.” This provision significantly broadens
the ability of senders to create an EBR with potential recipients, enabling the senders to freely and legally transmit a greater amount of
junk faxes. Although Congress gave the FCC some flexibility in limit74
ing the duration of an existing EBR, it did not provide the FCC with
any power to limit the relative ease of this initial EBR creation.
The JFPA does attempt to grant additional protections to help
curb the potential prevalence of junk faxes due to the EBR. Junk fax
senders are required to include notice of an opt-out opportunity for
75
the receivers of their unsolicited advertisements. This notice to optout must be contained on the first page of every junk fax in order for
the receiver to determine whether he or she wishes to stop receiving
76
the unsolicited advertisements. The notice must also explicitly state
that the recipient can request that the sender not send any future
77
junk faxes. Failure to comply with a proper request not to receive

71
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(4) (2003). The JFPA does not specifically define an
EBR. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(a)(2). Instead, the JFPA refers to the definition of the
term as set forth by the Code of Federal Regulations, which went into effect on January
1, 2003. Id. However, the JFPA does provide two slight alterations for purposes of
the Act. Id. §§ 227(a)(2)(A)–(B). First, an EBR “shall include a relationship between a person or entity and a business subscriber subject to the same terms applicable under such section to a relationship between a person or entity and a residential
subscriber . . . .” Id. § 227(a)(2)(A). Second, the JFPA limits the duration of the
EBR to a period that the FCC mandates. Id. § 227(a)(2)(B).
72
47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i). Before the FCC can exercise this right, it must
evaluate certain factors set forth by the JFPA and cannot commence a proceeding to
determine whether the duration of an EBR’s existence should be limited until three
months after the JFPA is enacted (the JFPA was enacted on July 9, 2005). Id. §§
227(b)(2)(G)(i)–(ii).
73
Id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(II). When discussing this specific provision in this Comment, it will be classified as though it is part of the EBR exception of the JFPA.
74
Id. § 227(b)(2)(G).
75
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D).
76
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(i).
77
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii).
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any further junk faxes “within the shortest reasonable time, as deter78
Moreover, the junk fax
mined by the Commission,” is unlawful.
sender must provide a recipient with a cost-free means of transmitting a request to opt-out and an opportunity to make such a request
79
“at any time on any day of the week.”
80
When compared with the junk fax regulations in the TCPA, the
JFPA’s recently added provisions allow significantly more flexibility
81
for the junk fax sender to market through fax machines. However,
the changes to the TCPA could have been expected considering the
inordinate amount of restraints imposed by the TCPA on junk fax
82
senders and its practical application with respect to junk faxing.
Congress recognized that a change was needed since legitimate fax
communications had become substantially burdened by the then cur83
rent law.
Not only could the JFPA have been anticipated, but many businesses consider the new provisions to be a dramatic improvement in
84
the junk fax field. As a practical matter, the FCC interpreted the
TCPA’s provision requiring “prior express invitation or permission”
to send junk faxes much more broadly than what Congress seemingly
85
intended pursuant to the plain language of the statute. The FCC’s
Rules and Regulations implementing the TCPA stated that “facsimile
transmission[s] from persons or entities who have an established
business relationship with the recipient can be deemed to be invited
86
or permitted by the recipient.” This finding effectively continued to
allow junk faxes, minimizing the original intended effectiveness of
the TCPA. The FCC’s interpretation that junk faxes were permissible
as long as there was an “established business relationship” had con78

See 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii).
Id. §§ 227(b)(2)(D)(iv)(II), (v).
80
See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
81
151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264–65 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
82
The FCC interpreted the TCPA’s provisions on junk faxes to allow for an established business relationship exception, even though the language of the TCPA made
no mention of an EBR. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
83
151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Upton).
84
See, e.g., Junk Fax Bill, Hearing on S. 714 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Jon. E. Bladine, Region
9
Director,
National
Newspaper
Association),
available
at
http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/bladine.pdf.
85
151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264–65 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
86
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 7
F.C.C.R. 8752, 8779 n.87 (1992).
79
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fused courts, since this language was not explicitly stated in the TCPA
87
itself. In 2003, the FCC acknowledged that this interpretation con88
flicted with the original intentions of the TCPA and planned on alleviating the problem:
Since 1992, the FCC has interpreted the general ban in the
[TCPA] on facsimile transmissions of advertising messages to include an “established business relationship exception,” which allows businesses to send advertising faxes to customers. But the exception is not actually written into the statute, and the agency
89
intend[ed] to revise its interpretation as of January 1, 2005.

The FCC sought this revision to ensure that the EBR exception would
no longer be implied and to re-establish the original intention of the
TCPA, which was to require “prior express invitation or permission”
90
before sending an unsolicited commercial fax. The FCC noted that
the TCPA’s interpretation failed to adequately consider the interests
of the junk fax recipient:
We now reverse our prior conclusion that an established business
relationship provides companies with the necessary express permission to send faxes to their customers . . . . [T]he EBR will no
longer be sufficient to show that an individual or business has
given their express permission to receive unsolicited facsimile advertisements. The record in this proceeding reveals consumers
and businesses receive faxes they believe they have neither solicited nor given their permission to receive. Recipients of these
faxed advertisements assume the cost of the paper used, the cost
associated with the use of the facsimile machine, and the costs associated with the time spent receiving a facsimile advertisement
during which the machine cannot be used by its owner to send or
91
receive other facsimile transmissions.

After considering the interference and cost-shifting involved in receiving an unwanted fax, the FCC reallocated the balance of priori87

See Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., 135 S.W.3d 365, 394
(Tex. App. 2004) (“This notion of deeming permission is based on an inference and,
as such, seems to conflict with the TCPA’s requirement that the invitation or permission be express . . . . Characterizing permission granted by implication as ‘express’
runs afoul of the plain meaning of the word.”).
88
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,,
18 F.C.C.R. 14,014, 14,127–28 (2003).
89
Richard E. Wiley & Rosemary C. Harold, Contentious Times in a Shifting Landscape, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 2004 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 2981, 2004), available at 811 PLI/PAT 109,
244 (November 2004).
90
151 CONG. REC. S3280, 3280 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2005) (statement of Sen. Smith).
91
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991,,
18 F.C.C.R. 14,014, 14,127–28 (2003) (footnote omitted).
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ties in order to favor junk fax recipients, noting that their interests far
92
outweighed those of the senders who wished to advertise.
The “prior express invitation or permission” provision in the
TCPA, however, imposed an extraordinary burden on businesses that
93
relied on junk fax advertising. These businesses strongly advocated
for some type of exemption, because they did not want to face the
problem of obtaining customers’ prior written consent before send94
ing each and every unsolicited fax. For example, a broad EBR exemption is beneficial to the real estate industry because unsolicited
advertising is commonly used to communicate in the normal course
95
of business to respond to potential home-owner inquires. Faxes are
used so frequently in this industry to communicate with clients be96
cause of their speed and cost effectiveness. These types of concerns
97
ultimately led to the adoption of the broad EBR exemption in the
98
JFPA, which seems to have provided the flexibility necessary to re99
However, Congress realieve businesses of this onerous burden.
soned that the intention of the JFPA was not to legalize junk faxes
but, rather, to provide an exception to the complete ban while offering junk fax recipients additional protection in the form of an opt100
out clause.
A. The Power of the FCC under the JFPA
Currently, it is difficult to gauge how the JFPA will affect the future of junk faxing, and only time will tell how the new provisions will
be implemented and enforced. Much of the changing landscape in
this field will depend on the FCC’s interpretations and the extent of

92

Berk W. Washburn, Facsimile Advertising and the Requirement to Get Signed, Written
Consents, 17 UTAH BAR J. 16, 19 (2004) (concluding that, as long as the public opinion supports the FCC’s balancing of priorities between junk fax senders and junk fax
recipients, junk fax senders should prepare to get prior express permission to send
these faxes or risk future liability under the TCPA).
93
151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5265 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
94
Id.
95
Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005: Hearing on S. 714 Before the Subcomm. on Trade,
Tourism, and Econ. Dev. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 109th Cong.
(2005) (statement of David Feeken, on behalf of the National Association of Realtors), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/feeken.pdf.
96
Id.
97
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
98
Id. § 227.
99
151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of Rep. Upton).
100
Id. (statement of Rep. Markey).
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the limitations that the FCC chooses to impose on the JFPA. The
FCC has the discretion to make some integral determinations with re101
spect to the EBR and opt-out provisions in the JFPA.
First, the Commission is authorized to make some of the provisions, such as the right to limit the “duration” of an existing EBR,
102
more stringent to protect junk fax recipients.
However, before the
FCC can establish any limits on the duration of the EBR, a few rele103
Initially, the Commission must devant factors must be evaluated.
termine whether there have been a significant number of complaints
104
over the existing EBR.
Next, the FCC must determine whether a
significant number of these complaints deals with junk faxes that
have been sent as a result of an EBR that the Commission believes is
105
Filonger in duration than a consumer’s reasonable expectations.
nally, after weighing both the senders’ costs in demonstrating that an
EBR exists within a certain period of time and the recipients’ benefits
106
in establishing a limitation on these EBRs, the FCC must evaluate
whether the costs would impose an undue burden on small busi107
nesses.
Second, the FCC has the flexibility to adjust various critical re108
quirements regarding the JFPA’s opt-out provision, including the
ability to determine the amount of time a junk fax sender has to
109
comply with a recipient’s opt-out request. In addition, the FCC has
discretionary authority to exempt certain types of small-business
senders from adhering to the opt-out rule if the costs are unduly bur110
The FCC may also waive the notice of an opt-outdensome.
opportunity requirement for tax-exempt nonprofit organizations that
are furthering their association’s tax-exempt purpose through unso111
licited advertisements.

101

See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i) (setting forth the FCC’s ability to limit
the duration of an EBR’s existence); id. § 227(b)(2)(D) (establishing the FCC’s discretionary authority relating to certain aspects of the JFPA’s opt-out provision).
102
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
103
See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(I)–(IV).
104
Id. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(I).
105
Id. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(II).
106
Id. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(III).
107
Id. § 227(b)(2)(G)(i)(IV).
108
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D).
109
See supra text accompanying note 78.
110
47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(D)(iv)(II).
111
Id. § 227(b)(2)(F).
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B. Practical Considerations and Effects of the JFPA
Although several essential determinations in the JFPA have yet to
be made, the new Act severely frustrates the primary purpose of the
TCPA, which sought to protect recipients’ privacy and property rights
112
by requiring their “prior express invitation or permission.”
A story
113
in the San Francisco Chronicle summarized the effects of the JFPA,
stating that it “[s]eems like a pretty fundamental right to both privacy
and personal property that just got taken away so that businesses will
114
be able to save a few bucks on advertising.” Although it remains to
be seen how the JFPA will affect the overall landscape of junk faxing
in general, much will depend on the interpretation and effectiveness
115
116
of the new EBR and opt-out provisions.
As a practical matter, the implications and effects of the new
provisions could adversely affect junk fax recipients more than Congress intended under the JFPA. First, the JFPA creates a rather broad
117
definition of an EBR in order to facilitate a marketer’s interests,
enabling a junk fax sender to easily create a legal relationship with a
118
In effect, this provision re-establishes junk-fax advertisrecipient.
ing as a viable marketing tool, which is what the TCPA had originally
119
sought to ban.
Furthermore, any EBR exemption “heightens financial, safety, and privacy concerns when extended to mobile devices or other communication tools for which consumers bear a bur120
In the
den of cost for each advertisement or sales call received.”
context of the JFPA, not only does the EBR provision essentially legalize a broad array of business relationships, but the statute fails to
adequately protect those individuals who are forced to constantly re121
Thus, the primary purpose of the JFPA,
ceive unsolicited faxes.
112

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Steve Kirsch, Letter to the Editor, Your Right to Not Receive Junk Faxes, S.F.
CHRON., Jul. 17, 2005, at E2.
114
Id.
115
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii).
116
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D).
117
See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
118
See supra notes 70–71, 73 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the
EBR provision in the JFPA).
119
See Hearing, supra note 84 (testimony of Jon. E. Bladine, Region 9 Director,
National Newspaper Association), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
pdf/bladine.pdf.
120
Shannon D. Torgerson, Note, Getting Down to Business: How the Established Business Relationship Exemption to the National Do-Not-Call Registry Forces Consumers to Pay for
Unwanted Sales Calls, 23 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 24, 32 (2004).
121
See infra note 127 and accompanying text. Faxes are different than other telemarketing activities in that they are more costly to the recipient. Such a broad EBR
113
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which was to balance the competing concerns of the junk fax senders
122
with those of the junk fax recipients, is jeopardized.
In addition, the relative ease with which a junk fax sender obtains a legal relationship with a recipient under the JFPA—and the
breadth of such a relationship—could significantly impact the stat123
ute’s interpretation in future litigation.
Although the FCC has the
124
ability to limit the duration of an EBR, the Commission’s power in
this area is substantially diminished if a junk fax sender is constantly
able to re-establish a valid legal relationship simply by obtaining a re125
cipient’s fax number from a website, directory, or advertisement.
Therefore, these new provisions threaten to dismantle the bright-line
distinctions that Congress had created in the original TCPA with respect to which senders’ junk faxes were legally allowable.
Furthermore, it is unfair to place the burden of opting out on
126
the recipient of the junk fax while giving the junk-fax sender a cer127
tain amount of time to comply with any opt-out requests. Not only
are recipients forced to pay for the original fax(es) before the opportunity to opt-out is made available, but they may continue to see their
privacy and property interests invaded for a period of time even after
they have made an opt-out request. In the interim, many faxes can
be sent, and much damage can be done.
The practical effects of the opt-out provision in the JFPA pose
additional concerns. For instance, the JFPA provides that the junk
fax recipient receive a cost-free method of opting-out of any un128
wanted faxes.
However, this provision is merely an illusion, since
the recipient will always be forced to incur the cost of the time that it
129
takes to opt-out. In addition, the opt-out provision may not be useprovision, without a complementary system to adequately protect the interests of
junk fax recipients, fails to take these increased costs to the recipient into account.
122
151 CONG. REC. S3280, 3280 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2005) (statement of Sen. Smith).
123
Michael P. Broadhurst, New Law Allows Business to Communicate With Customers by
Fax, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 9, 2005, at 7.
124
47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(G) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
125
See id. § 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(II). Although this exception is not actually called an
EBR relationship, it acts like one in that it creates another loophole around the
“prior express permission” requirement, enabling a marketer to continue sending
junk faxes.
126
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(ii).
127
Id. The FCC is free to determine the amount of time that a junk fax sender
has to comply with any opt-out requests. Id.
128
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D)(iv)(II).
129
Congress considered the importance of an individual’s time in the CAN-SPAM
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(3) (Supp. IV 2004). Congress wanted to prevent an individual from incurring costs in the form of time needlessly spent trying to access, review, and discard spam. Id. Similarly, under the JFPA, junk fax recipients are forced

LAUDINO FINAL

2007]

4/12/2007 5:09:08 PM

COMMENT

851

ful to the average recipient. Many individuals feel as though the optout provisions with regard to spam e-mails do not work because any
attempted opt-out request would either not be heeded by the sender
or would open the receiver up to more spam by confirming the valid130
Depending on the length of time
ity of his or her e-mail address.
that it takes for the recipients to complete their opt-out requests and
the level of enforcement of any unfulfilled requests, recipients may
be unlikely to utilize this opt-out protection.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE INTRUSIVENESS OF THE EBR AND
OPT-OUT PROVISIONS
Many individuals are not even interested in receiving junk faxes
from those who have established a legitimate business relationship
131
with them. The underlying issue regarding the JFPA is whether the
132
133
EBR and opt-out provisions are sufficient to continue protecting
the privacy and property concerns of these junk fax recipients, which
is the issue that Congress intended to address with the original
134
Under the JFPA, however, recipients must take the time to
TCPA.
opt-out of every broad EBR that they may have inadvertently created
with a junk fax sender or risk having their phone lines tied up, at any
given point, with an infinite amount of junk faxes. By enabling this
type of outcome, the JFPA fails to effectuate the TCPA’s intent and
inadequately shields a recipient from the intrusiveness caused by junk
135
fax advertising.
The primary purpose of the TCPA was to “protect the privacy in136
terests” of individuals by restricting the fax machine to certain uses.
Part of the reason for the TCPA’s complete ban on unsolicited faxes
without “prior express invitation or permission” was due to junk fax
137
In order to determine whether the
recipients’ privacy concerns.
new provisions of the JFPA impinge on these privacy interests, they
to spend time reviewing junk faxes, and subsequently opting out of any unwanted
EBRs. Cf. Hernandez v. Kalinowski, 146 F.3d 196, 200 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting Benjamin Franklin’s famous phrase “time is money”).
130
Richard C. Balough, The Do-Not-Call Registry Model is Not the Answer to Spam, 22 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 79, 86–87 (2003).
131
Kirsh, supra note 113, at E2.
132
JFPA, 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
133
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D).
134
See supra notes 5, 23, 31–36 and accompanying text.
135
Id.
136
Int’l Sci. & Tech. Inst. v. Inacom Commc’ns, 106 F.3d 1146, 1150 (4th Cir.
1997) (citing S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 1 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968,
1968).
137
See supra notes 23, 31 and accompanying text.
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must be analyzed alongside similar privacy regulations and within the
context of Congress’ original intentions under the TCPA.
138
In Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. American Blast Fax, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that Congress,
when adopting the TCPA, intentionally treated junk faxes and automated calls differently than live telemarketer calls, which are allowed
139
unless an individual objects in advance.
The court further noted
that Congress distinguished between these methods because it found
that live telemarketing solicitations were less invasive with respect to
an individual’s privacy and less of a nuisance than artificial or prere140
The court examined Congress’ reasoning,
corded telephone calls.
stating that “[a]rtificial or prerecorded messages, like a faxed advertisement, were believed to have heightened intrusiveness because
they are unable to ‘interact with the customer except in prepro141
grammed ways.’”
Recently, nuisance and privacy concerns associated with electronic mail (e-mail) have become major issues as well. Although email has quickly become an important and reliable form of communication, its convenience and efficiency have been severely threatened by the growing volume of unsolicited e-mail, commonly re142
ferred to as “spam.”
A significant amount of an individual’s time
and money can be needlessly spent reviewing and storing this un143
wanted spam.
As a result, Congress passed the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing (CAN-SPAM)
144
Act of 2003, which went into effect on January 1, 2004, in order to
145
impose limitations on spam.
The primary purpose of the CANSPAM Act is to:
(i) prohibit senders of [e-mail] for primarily commercial advertisement or promotional purposes from deceiving intended recipients or Internet service providers as to the source or subject
matter of their e-mail messages; (ii) require such e-mail senders to
give recipients an opportunity to decline to receive future com138

323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 657 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(c) (2000 & Supp. III 2003); 47 C.F.R. §
64.1200(e)(2)(iii) (2002)).
140
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 4 & n.4, 5 & n.5 (1991), as reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1972–73).
141
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 102-178, at 4–5 (1991), as reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1972).
142
15 U.S.C. § 7701(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
143
Id. § 7701(a)(3).
144
Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (Supp.
IV. 2004)).
145
Id.
139
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mercial e-mail from them and to honor such requests; (iii) require senders of unsolicited commercial e-mail (UCE) to also include a valid physical address in the e-mail message and a clear
notice that the message is an advertisement or solicitation; and
(iv) prohibit businesses from knowingly promoting, or permitting
the promotion of, their trade or business through e-mail transmit146
ted with false or misleading sender or routing information.

In addition, the CAN-SPAM Act also permits the Federal Trade
Commission to establish and implement a nationwide “Do-Not-E147
Mail” registry in the future.
The originally proposed CAN-SPAM Act allowed commercial email solicitations as long as an individual gave his express permission
148
or implied consent.
The original “implied consent” provision was
strikingly similar to both the EBR and opt-out provisions in the
149
For the proposed “implied consent” provision to have apJFPA.
plied, there must have been a business transaction between the individual and the solicitor within three years of the e-mail message along
with notice of an opportunity not to receive the commercial e-mails,
either at the time of the transaction or upon receipt of the first e150
mail, which the recipient did not exercise. In addition, visitation to
a website, in which the recipient knowingly submitted his e-mail address, could be considered a business transaction under the proposed
151
However, the implied consent exception was removed
provision.
before the bill was passed, leaving only the “express permission” lan152
guage as an acceptable means for permitting e-mail solicitations.
Congress decided to remove the “implied consent” exception upon
its realization that the creation of “such a wide loophole would ren153
der the [A]ct ineffective.”

146

S. REP. NO. 108-102, at 1 (2003), as reprinted in 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2348.
15 U.S.C. § 7708.
148
Michael P. Considine, Comment, User Registration Websites: Possible E-Loopholes to
the National Do-Not-Call Registry, 53 EMORY L.J. 1951, 1968 (2004) (citing 149 CONG.
REC. S13176, 13177 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003); 149 CONG. REC. S13012 (daily ed. Oct.
22, 2003)).
149
See id. (discussing how the “implied consent” language was similar to the established business relationship exception).
150
149 CONG. REC. S13176, 13177 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003); see also Considine, supra note 148, at 1968 (discussing the originally proposed provisions of the CANSPAM Act).
151
149 CONG. REC. S13176, 13177 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003); see also Considine, supra note 148, at 1968.
152
Considine, supra note 148, at 1968 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (Supp. 2004)).
153
Id.
147
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Congress also discussed the possibility that an EBR exception
might undermine the effectiveness of the national do-not-call registry:
Congress understood that the established business relationship
exception would possibly prove to be a detriment to the national
do-not-call registry. In discussing the established business relationship exception, Senator Dodd noted that “[t]here are going
to be people coming back, once they discover that any prior business relationship pretty much will allow the exception to occur . . .
[that] are going to be asking us to come back and even close the
154
loophole down further.”

The inclusion of an EBR exception has repeatedly invoked widespread concern within Congress as to the provision’s potential to
render an entire regulation ineffective. This potential seems to have
been the driving force behind the ultimate exclusion of the EBR ex155
ception in the CAN-SPAM Act.
Unlike bulk e-mail and junk faxing, however, which can be collected at the recipient’s leisure, telemarketing may be slightly more
intrusive on an individual’s privacy rights because the “ring of the
156
This additional privacy
telephone demands immediate attention.”
concern may help account for the lack of an EBR with respect to un157
solicited machine-based telemarketing.
But even though the privacy concerns associated with junk faxing may not, by themselves, be
as strong as that of receiving an unwanted artificial or prerecorded
telemarketing call, the total intrusiveness of the marketing effort
158
must be taken into account when attempting to regulate.
In addition to the privacy concerns that junk faxes impose upon
an individual, much of the intrusiveness of the JFPA centers on the
fact that the broad EBR provision enables potential senders to take
159
When deterrecipients’ property without their express consent.
mining the total intrusiveness of a particular marketing method, the
unwanted invasion on another’s property interests has demanded
154
Id. at 1969 (citing 149 CONG. REC. S11957, 11964 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2003)
(statement of Sen. Dodd)) (alteration in original).
155
Although the exclusion of an EBR had been discussed in connection with the
national do-not-call registry, the provision was ultimately included. Telemarketing
Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4634 (Jan. 29, 2003).
156
State v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 888 (Minn. 1992).
157
47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(1)(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
158
See Considine, supra note 148, at 1968 (discussing how the existence of an EBR
exception strongly depends on the intrusiveness of the marketing effort that Congress is attempting to curtail). “[T]he more intrusive the marketing effort, the less
likely an [EBR] will be found.” Id.
159
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
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considerable attention. For instance, courts have recognized the affect that spam has on the property rights of Internet Service Providers
160
(ISPs), who are forced to bear the costs of these unwanted e161
mails.
High volumes of unsolicited spam impair the value of an
ISPs server capacity, ultimately diminishing the resources available to
162
the ISP subscribers.
Much like spam, junk faxes have similar effects on property
rights, except that the individual user is the one who must endure the
163
marketers’ advertising costs.
In Resource Bankshares Corp. v. St. Paul
164
Mercury Ins. Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit noted the property concerns associated with the receipt of a
junk fax:
It is obvious to anyone familiar with a modern office that receipt
is a “natural or probable consequence” of sending a fax, and receipt alone occasions the very property damage the TCPA was
written to address: depletion of the recipient’s time, toner, and
165
paper, and occupation of the fax machine and phone line.

This is one of the major reasons why the FCC attempted to respond
166
to junk faxes by requiring “express permission” and by eliminating
167
In Missouri ex rel. Nixon
any EBR exception that may have applied.
168
v. American Blast Fax, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit discussed how the TCPA’s provisions advanced the
governmental interest and ultimate goal of protecting the public

160

According to PCMag.com, an Internet Service Provider is defined as “[a]n organization that provides access to the Internet . . . . Large ISPs, such as America
Online (AOL) and Microsoft Network (MSN), also provide proprietary databases,
forums and services in addition to Internet access.” PCMag.com Encyclopedia of IT
Terms, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0%2C2542%2Ct%3DISP&i%3
D45481%2C00.asp (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
161
The personal property of an ISP is infringed upon when unwanted spam is
processed and stored on their servers. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,
962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017–18 (S.D. Ohio 1997); see also Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM,
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that the personal property of
an ISP was invaded when the defendant used its computer network to transmit unsolicited bulk e-mails).
162
CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022–23. This also indirectly hurts the individual
user who loses the efficiencies created by an e-mail service. Id. at 1023.
163
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
164
407 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2005).
165
Id. at 639.
166
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
167
Res. Bankshares, 407 F.3d at 639. The FCC response, requiring only “express
permission” facilitated the enactment of the JFPA. See supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
168
323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003).
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169

from unwanted advertising costs. The circuit court stated: “Because
of the cost shifting of fax advertising, it was consistent for Congress to
treat unsolicited fax advertisements differently than live telemarket170
Although the TCPA bans telemarketers from making
ing calls.”
phone calls to wireless numbers using an “artificial or prerecorded
171
voice,” the FCC has allowed “live” unsolicited telemarketers to call
wireless cell phones, despite any charges to the recipient for receiving
172
the call.
The total intrusiveness of a “live” telemarketer versus that
of an “artificial or prerecorded voice” played an integral role in the
FCC’s determination as to how each of these marketing methods
should operate.
Since the EBR exception creates such a wide loophole, its application should be limited to fairly unintrusive marketing efforts in order to perpetuate a regulation’s intended effect. Upon regulating e173
mail solicitations in the CAN-SPAM Act, Congress determined that
an EBR exemption would hinder the effectiveness of the statute’s

169

Id. at 657.
Id.
171
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
172
In re Rules and Regulations Implementing Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 68
Fed. Reg. 44,144, 44,165 (July 25, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 64, 68).
Even though the recipient may be charged for a solicitation call to a wireless number
and the same economic and safety concerns are applicable to both live and artificial
or prerecorded solicitations, “the Commission has determined not to prohibit all live
telephone solicitations to wireless numbers.” Id. However, artificial or prerecorded
messages to wireless numbers are banned. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)).
Congress has determined that these artificial or prerecorded messages are costly, inconvenient and “a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation
calls.” Id. The FCC does point out that the TCPA prohibits any “live solicitation calls
to wireless numbers using an autodialer.” Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)). Furthermore, the national do-not-call database allows for an individual to register his or
her wireless telephone number to enable the potential recipient to avoid receiving
any “live” telemarketing phone calls to these wireless phones. Id. at 44,165–66.
Thus, the FCC determined that these individuals with wireless numbers are equipped
with the relatively simple means to prevent the majority of “live” telemarketers from
calling. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act of 1991, 68 Fed. Reg. at 44,166. However, simply registering on the do-not-call
database does not prevent any calls from those with whom the wireless subscriber has
an EBR. Id. The wireless subscriber can still make a “company-specific do-not-call
request” if he wishes to terminate this EBR. Id. By controlling, through the use of
the do-not-call database, “live” telephone solicitations where there is an EBR, the
FCC determined that a prohibition on these calls to a wireless number would “unduly restrict telemarketers’ ability to contact those consumers who do not object to
receiving telemarketing calls and use their wireless phones as either their primary or
only phone.” Id.
173
15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–13 (Supp IV 2004).
170
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174

provisions.
Although unsolicited e-mail messages can be easily discarded by the recipient, they are extremely easy and cost-efficient for
175
This creates a potentially intrusive form of ada marketer to send.
vertising since the receiver may be forced to incur storage costs and
176
time spent “accessing, reviewing, and discarding” the spam.
The
177
JFPA deals with a similar sender-friendly form of marketing, which
can result in the majority of a marketer’s advertising costs being
178
pushed onto the recipient.
This cost-shifting, coupled with the invasion of a junk fax on a recipient’s privacy rights, is comparable to
179
the intrusiveness imposed upon an individual receiving spam.
For
this reason, the broad EBR provision in the JFPA fails to adequately
accommodate a junk fax recipient’s interests, and is an inappropriate
180
solution to the overall balance sought by the TCPA.
181
Although the JFPA’s opt-out clause may help to mitigate some
of the intrusiveness of junk fax advertising, this provision does not
adequately compensate a recipient for the extraordinary burden im182
The opt-out clause may not efposed by the Act’s EBR provision.
fectively control junk faxing since a “significant amount of harm can
183
be done very rapidly” before the recipient can actually opt-out.
In
addition, many recipients are unaware of their rights under the optout system, and even though they do not wish to receive the mes184
sages, they will incur significant costs. Furthermore, the opt-out system in the JFPA is similar to the opt-out provision that was discussed
in connection with the unsolicited e-mail regulations in the CAN185
SPAM Act. Despite the presence of this opt-out provision, Congress
still apparently found that the provisions in that statute would be in186
effective due to the EBR’s wide loophole.
174
See supra note 153 and accompanying text. It was not called an EBR in the
CAN-SPAM Act. Rather, it was referred to as the “implied consent” provision, although it had the same basic effect as the EBR provision in the JFPA. See supra note
150 and accompanying text.
175
15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1).
176
Id. § 7701(a)(3) (discussing the costs of spam to recipients).
177
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
178
See supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
179
See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text.
180
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
181
47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(D) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
182
Id. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii).
183
Fisher, supra note 38, at 381.
184
Id. Therefore, “a complete ban is likely to be the only reasonable solution
when the cost to the consumer massively exceeds the cost to the solicitor.” Id.
185
See supra notes 148–153 and accompanying text.
186
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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RECOMMENDATIONS TO BETTER BALANCE THE INTENTIONS OF
BOTH THE JFPA AND THE TCPA

Since the regulations imposed in the original TCPA seemed to
weigh heavily in favor of protecting the junk fax recipient at the ex187
pense of the sender, Congress determined that the JFPA was necessary in order to secure an appropriate balance between each side’s
188
competing interests and concerns. The JFPA’s provisions, however,
have tipped the scales decidedly in favor of the junk fax sender. Although those who wish to advertise through fax machines should be
189
afforded First Amendment commercial speech protection, a slightly
190
191
different approach concerning the EBR and opt-out provisions
could provide this protection and enhance the practical effects of the
192
JFPA at the same time. Due to the intrusiveness of junk faxes, the
current interplay between the EBR and opt-out provisions seems to
render any junk fax regulations ineffective. The following are a few
of the possible solutions that will achieve a more even balance among
these competing concerns.
A. Creation of an EBR
Instead of imposing the burden to “opt-out” of junk faxes on the
recipients, Congress should appropriately shift the burden to the
senders through the use of an “opt-in” provision. Although the FCC’s
193
revised interpretation of the original TCPA may have stymied the
194
marketing attempts of junk fax senders, the “prior express permis195
sion” requirement before each and every fax would have afforded a
196
significant amount of protection for junk fax recipients. By permitting the creation of an EBR merely through public knowledge of a
197
recipient’s fax number, however, the JFPA eliminates this protec187
See 151 CONG. REC. H5262, 5264–65 (daily ed. Jun. 28, 2005) (statement of
Rep. Markey).
188
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
189
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
190
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
191
Id. § 227(b)(2)(D).
192
See supra notes 31–33, 35–37, 44 and accompanying text.
193
See supra notes 87–92 and accompanying text.
194
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
195
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
196
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
197
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(I)–(II) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006). A marketer can send junk faxes to a recipient if the recipient voluntarily communicates his
number in the context of an EBR, or if the sender finds the number in “a directory,
advertisement, or site on the Internet to which the recipient voluntarily agreed to
make available its [fax] number for public distribution.” Id.
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tion and enables an EBR to be created much too easily. Thus, in order to further balance the competing interests of both the junk fax
receivers and the senders, a receiver should be required to sign a onetime, signed, and written consent in order to originally “opt-in” for
these junk faxes. The sender can then use this written consent to establish an EBR with the receiver; thus narrowing down the ability to
create an EBR in the first place.
There are two possible ways to adopt this “opt-in” system, both of
which grant significantly more protection to the junk fax receiver
than the current EBR provision while still considering the interests of
the junk fax sender. First, a strict “opt-in” provision could be used
where the one and only way to create an EBR, and thus allow senders
to transmit junk faxes to a particular recipient, is to require the recipient to “opt-in.” For example, a sender would only be able to
transmit junk faxes to those receivers who have signed a one-time,
prior written consent agreement. Once the one-time “opt-in” is
signed by the recipient, an EBR is created and the sender can freely
transmit junk faxes to that recipient without his or her “prior written
consent.”
Second, if Congress feels that the current EBR provision should
be narrowed without completely eliminating it, a modified “opt-in”
approach should be taken. Under this approach, the current EBR
under the JFPA is still completely eliminated unless a recipient decides to either opt-in under the one-time “opt-in” consent provision or
the recipient falls within a few special categories of relationships
which could automatically establish an EBR, even without the recipient purposely deciding to “opt-in.” Under this modified approach,
Congress could define certain “special” relationships that would
automatically qualify as EBRs. For example, Congress may determine
that one of these “special” categories is the relationship between a
customer and a business from which a product or a service has been
purchased by the consumer within a specific time period, such as the
previous three months. However, in order to decrease the wide
198
loopholes that are apparent in the JFPA’s current EBR relationship,
these “special” categories should be fairly limited in scope and defined much more narrowly. This way, it would still be significantly
harder for a particular relationship to qualify as an EBR under the
“modified opt-in” approach than under the current broad EBR quali199
fications in the JFPA.
Under this “modified opt-in” approach, any

198
199

Id. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii).
Id.
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relationship that does not fall within one of these “special” categories
is not an EBR, and the receiver must then provide the sender with
the one-time “opt-in” consent in order to create a valid EBR.
Importantly, this additional opt-in feature would not replace or
eliminate the current opt-out provision in the JFPA. Rather, the optout clause in the JFPA could be modified to apply to those who have
given their express written permission or implied permission through
a “special” relationship but later decide to terminate the EBR and
discontinue junk fax receipt. Once an EBR is created, the burden
would then appropriately fall on the receiver to “opt-out” of the EBR
200
relationship.
Both of these systems should withstand any challenges that they
201
unlawfully restrict commercial speech, since the TCPA frequently
202
withstood such First Amendment challenges, and these provisions
203
are more narrowly tailored to serve Congress’ interest in preventing
204
In addition, with either system in
cost-shifting in fax advertising.
place, the interests and goals of the junk fax sender and the junk fax
receiver would be taken into account. Junk fax senders, such as those
in the real estate industry, would be able to realize cost-efficiencies
because they would not have to be burdened with constantly obtaining a consumers’ prior written consent before sending each and every
205
Furthermore, the broad loophole that the EBR exception crefax.
ated is eliminated. A junk fax receiver who does not wish to receive
these faxes could adequately protect his or her privacy and property
interests from those senders who may be able to establish some type
of attenuated EBR under the current system.
B. The FCC’s Power
A second possible improvement to the JFPA deals with the FCC’s
206
ability to influence the development of an EBR. Although the FCC
207
Conmay currently limit the duration of a viable EBR’s existence,
gress should grant the FCC sole discretion to enhance or restrict the
ability of a marketer to create a viable EBR with a junk fax recipient in

200
This opt-out provision could work much like the “opt-out” provision in the
JFPA. Id. § 227(b)(2)(D).
201
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
202
See supra notes 55–64 and accompanying text.
203
See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
204
See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
205
See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
206
See supra notes 102–107 and accompanying text.
207
See supra notes 72, 102, 107 and accompanying text.
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208

the first place. While this type of FCC power is not necessary under
209
a “strict opt-in” system, such as the one discussed above, under the
“modified opt-in” approach, this power would enable the FCC to establish or remove any “special” automatic EBRs that prove helpful or
210
ineffective when compared to the overall intentions of the Act.
211
Even under the current EBR approach taken in the JFPA, granting
the FCC the ability to narrow the creation of an EBR would permit it
to significantly enhance the practical effects of the Act.
Much like the current provisions in the JFPA, in either of the
212
two new approaches that this Comment proposes, the FCC can still
213
continue imposing any necessary limits on the duration of an EBR
created through either “prior express written consent” or through a
“special” automatic EBR. For example, the FCC may determine that
the recipient’s one-time “opt-in” to receive junk faxes is not sufficient
to create an indefinite EBR. Rather, the FCC may require the recipient to renew his or her “opt-in” consent every 12 months in order to
re-establish a valid legal relationship with the junk fax sender for the
following year. Thus, the FCC could continually monitor the various
legal relationships and increase or decrease their duration depending
on the practical effects of the legal relationship on the interests of all
the parties involved.

208

In defining an EBR, the JFPA refers to 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 of the Code of Federal
Regulations that went into effect as of January 1, 2003. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the JFPA specifically permits certain other EBRs, aside
from the one that can be created pursuant to the definition provided by the Code of
Federal Regulations. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. The JFPA’s provisions,
however, do not grant the FCC the ability to continuously monitor and change what
constitutes a viable EBR.
209
See supra Part VI.A.
210
Granting the FCC the ability to limit or enhance the potential creation of an
EBR in the first place may not matter if the “opt-in” limitation was adopted because,
under the “opt-in” scenario, the sole means for creating an EBR is through the onetime prior written consent of the recipient. Under the “modified opt-in” scenario,
however, Congress may define certain “special” relationships as automatic EBRs,
even without the prior express written permission of the recipient. Under this scenario, the FCC could eliminate any automatic “special” EBRs that are too burdensome on the junk fax recipient. Likewise, the FCC could create new automatic “special” EBRs if the junk fax sender is being unduly burdened.
211
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (West 2001 & Supp. 2006).
212
This refers to both the “strict opt-in” approach and the “modified opt-in” approach.
213
47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(2)(G).
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CONCLUSION

One of the primary reasons for the JFPA was to alleviate the on214
erous burden that the FCC sought to impose on junk fax senders.
In addition, the JFPA set out to fulfill one of the main intentions of
215
the TCPA, which was to accommodate, align, and balance the competing interests of the junk fax sender with the interests of the junk
216
However, the JFPA has tipped the scales in favor of
fax recipient.
the junk fax sender, forcing the recipients to bear a fairly intrusive
burden on their privacy and property interests, even though they may
not wish to receive the sender’s message. Not only are recipients intruded upon in the form of an initial fax before receiving an opt-out
opportunity, but they are then forced to bear the burden of opting217
out of each broadly created EBR in order to prevent any future so218
licitations.
Contrary to other forms of marketing, the approach
taken by the JFPA forces unwilling recipients to bear the marketers’
initial advertising costs. While someone must incur these initial costs,
this onerous burden should not fall on the innocent recipient.
Rather, this cost, much like other marketing costs, can only fairly be
pushed onto the senders who are seeking to market or promote their
219
Thereproducts or services through unsolicited advertisements.
fore, the adoption of a junk fax method, such as the “strict” or “modi220
fied” opt-in approach, would properly align these initial burdens
while appropriately balancing each party’s overall interests and concerns.

214

See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
216
151 CONG. REC. S3280 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 2005) (statement of Sen. Smith).
217
47 U.S.C.A. §§ 227(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii).
218
Id. §§ 227(b)(2)(D)–(E).
219
Gary Miller, How to Can Spam: Legislating Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail, 2 VAND.
J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 127, 131 (2000) (“[N]o one should be required to subsidize someone else's advertisements. After all, speech is only free if you do not force someone
else to pay for it.”).
220
See supra Part VI.A.
215

